Where we focus, what we're proven at, what needs to change, and what comes next
The workshop validated that TGH has built real, proven capabilities in program delivery, venture sourcing, government partnerships, and ecosystem credibility. It also confirmed that the department's impact has been diluted by operating across too many activities without enough focus or resources on any single one.
The team aligned on three things: where we focus, who we bring value to, and what we need to change. This document summarizes those findings and outlines what comes next.
Program design and delivery. Across every program we've run (accelerators, incubators, training), the assessment showed consistent quality: smooth operations, strong participant outcomes, sponsor satisfaction, and organic brand attraction (1,200+ applications with zero paid marketing). This is TGH's most consistently validated capability.
Tech sourcing and due diligence. Identifying BU pain points, sourcing technology solutions, vetting vendors, and measuring POC success all work. The front end of the retail tech pipeline is strong.
Government and institutional partnerships. Partnerships with Sundouq Al Watan, F100, Hub71, DED, and Dubai SMEs give TGH authority, revenue through paid programs, and a pipeline of government-backed projects. ADIO is ongoing; Dubai Culture is in progress.
External commercial viability of ventures. The studio model shifted from fully Group-funded ventures to externally funded, commercially viable companies. Ventures survive and grow outside the Group. External investors have co-invested, validating market relevance.
Ecosystem credibility. All investor relationships were built by the team with zero introductions from the wider Group. Conference attendance converts to deal flow and investment. Media and PR generate 800+ organic program applications and 300+ venture applications annually.
Our focus is on creating new businesses and deploying technology that enhances retail experiences for the end consumer. This encompasses both front-end experiences (in-store, e-commerce, customer touchpoints) and operational improvements (logistics, data, delivery) that directly impact the customer.
Programs are a proven capability that supports this focus by generating revenue, attracting deal flow, and building ecosystem authority. They are not the mandate themselves.
Brand sourcing for the Group's portfolio (belongs with BD/M&A). Innovation culture workshops and training (belongs with L&D). University visits for Group talent attraction (belongs with TA/Group Comms). These activities served the Group but diluted TGH's core expertise.
TGH is strong at sourcing and building. It has not yet cracked scaling within the Group. POCs get implemented but don't convert to Group-wide deployments. Ventures survive externally but aren't used by BUs. The handoff point between "TGH proved value" and "the Group adopts it" is where impact stalls.
The operating model needs a defined exit point: where TGH's job ends and the BU takes ownership, with the budget and mandate to continue.
Currently, TGH identifies opportunities and pushes them to BUs. When the need doesn't originate from the BU, adoption stalls because budgets don't exist for unsolicited solutions. The operating model needs to create a mechanism where BUs come to TGH with problems, and TGH sources or builds the solution.
The department has operated across eight activity pillars with a small team. This breadth created confusion about TGH's core expertise and spread resources too thin to deliver depth on any single pillar. The operating model needs to match the resource level to the mandate, or narrow the mandate to fit the resources.
These three gaps are structural, not performance issues. The team has delivered consistently within its constraints. Fixing them requires changes to how TGH connects to the Group, not changes to the team.
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| Program delivery with zero failures across all assessments | Scaling post-POC is the universal failure point |
| 1,200+ brands/startups sourced organically | BU pull model doesn't exist (push only) |
| Government partnerships as authority and revenue moat | Activities spread across 8 pillars with limited team |
| Ventures have proven external commercial viability | Decision-making slow, case-by-case, lacks standardization |
| Opportunities | Risks |
|---|---|
| Retail/luxury innovation is underserved in MENA VC | Innovation not currently in the Group's 10-year strategy |
| Turn sourcing capability into a systematic tool for BUs | Multiple departments do overlapping innovation work |
| Government entities actively seeking innovation partners | Group has shifted from startup experimentation to enterprise solutions |
| Leadership transition window to reposition and consolidate | Annual budget cycles conflict with multi-year venture timelines |
The workshop produced alignment on direction. The next step is translating that into an operating model and roadmap for R0. Specifically:
Define the operating model. How does TGH deliver on venture building and tech enablement with the current team? What is the structure: which activities are core, which are supporting, and which stop? How does governance work (investment decisions, stage gates, reporting)?
Design the BU engagement model. How do we shift from push to pull? What does the intake process look like when a BU comes with a problem? How do we define the exit point where TGH hands off and the BU scales?
Build the R0 roadmap. Based on the operating model, what are the specific initiatives, milestones, and resource requirements for the next budget cycle? Which ventures continue, which POCs are pursued, which programs run, and what is the expected impact?
Align with leadership. Present the operating model and roadmap for input and endorsement, ensuring innovation has a clear place in the Group's strategic planning going forward.