What we achieved, where we focus next, and what needs to change
The workshop brought the team together to assess eight years of activity, align on strengths and gaps, and define direction for the next phase. Pre-reads covering corporate innovation models, regional and global benchmarks, and the MENA venture landscape were distributed in advance.
The day was structured around four exercises:
This document synthesizes the insights from the day and outlines the proposed direction.
The Greenhouse has operated through distinct phases, each with its own mandate. The first phase (years 1-3) was about sparking innovation culture across the Group: bringing people to the space, running workshops, changing how people think about retail. This worked. It created movement internally and established the Greenhouse as a recognizable platform.
The second phase shifted the mandate externally: building an ecosystem presence, attracting external entrepreneurs, developing government partnerships, and creating ventures that could stand on their own commercially. This was not a departure from the Group; it was the mandate. And we delivered on it.
Partnerships with Sundouq Al Watan, F100, Hub71, and DED. The ADIO program (ongoing). Dubai Culture (in progress). External co-investment attracted into our ventures. 1,200+ brands and startups sourced organically. Revenue generated from paid programs, turning TGH into the only innovation cost center to drive revenue for the Group. All investor relationships built by the team with zero introductions from anyone in the wider organization.
Program design and delivery had a 100% success rate in the assessment: zero activities in "didn't work." Across every program we've run, the team delivered smooth operations, strong participant outcomes, high-quality curriculum, and organic brand attraction with zero paid marketing. External partners have called TGH's program delivery the best they've experienced. We know how to identify an objective, design a program that answers it, source the right participants, and deliver on budget.
The studio model evolved from fully Group-funded ventures (up to $2M each) to externally funded, commercially viable companies operating on $150K maximum investment. The shift was deliberate and the ventures adapted. The Abaya Lab has survived market downturns that shut down competitors. Other ventures in the portfolio continue to operate, grow their customer base, and maintain cash flow without Group support.
In a market where 90% of startups fail, the majority of TGH's portfolio is still standing. This is not a small achievement.
The ecosystem credibility TGH has today was built by the team. Conference attendance converts to deal flow and investment. Media and PR generate 800+ organic program applications and 300+ venture applications annually. The Greenhouse brand carries weight in the regional startup and innovation ecosystem, and this equity was built from scratch.
Our focus is on creating new businesses and sourcing technology that enhances retail experiences for the end consumer. This encompasses front-end experiences (in-store, e-commerce, customer touchpoints) and operational improvements (logistics, data, delivery) that directly impact the customer.
Programs are a proven capability that supports this focus by generating revenue, attracting deal flow, and building ecosystem authority. They are not the mandate themselves but a powerful enabler of it.
Brand sourcing for the Group's portfolio (belongs with BD/M&A, where multiple departments are already doing this). Innovation culture workshops and training (belongs with L&D). University visits for Group talent attraction (belongs with TA/Group Comms). These activities served the Group but diluted TGH's core expertise and created confusion about what the Greenhouse actually does.
The team collectively agreed that the following are essential to the Greenhouse's identity and must be maintained regardless of how the operating model evolves:
The physical space. The Greenhouse space is not just an office. It is a platform for retail experimentation, a venue that hosts delegations and associations, and a tangible expression of the Group's commitment to innovation. The space has become a destination for the Group's external-facing moments: hosting delegations, associations, visiting partners, and international guests. It is also a talent attraction point; team members across the Group have cited the Greenhouse as part of why they joined.
The brand and external presence. The Greenhouse brand, website, social media, and LinkedIn are assets that took years to build. They attract founders, brands, investors, and government partners organically. This equity needs to be safeguarded and strengthened, not absorbed into a generic Group identity.
The entrepreneurial way of working. Speed, agility, stage-gated decision-making, test-learn-pivot cycles. These are what allow a small team to operate across ventures and programs simultaneously. The Greenhouse cannot function as a traditional corporate department with traditional corporate processes.
The voice of innovation. Even as the mandate narrows, TGH must remain the Group's voice on innovation, retail technology, and the startup ecosystem. This means maintaining ecosystem relationships, attending key conferences, and communicating what we learn back to the Group consistently.
TGH is strong at sourcing and building. It has not yet cracked scaling within the Group. POCs get implemented but don't convert to Group-wide deployments. Ventures survive externally but aren't used by BUs. The handoff point between "TGH proved value" and "the Group adopts it" is where impact stalls.
This is partly structural: tech team prioritization blocks integration, budgets don't exist for unsolicited solutions, and the Group has shifted from startup experimentation to enterprise solutions. The operating model needs a defined exit point where TGH's job ends and the BU takes ownership, with the budget and mandate to continue.
Currently, TGH identifies opportunities and brings them to BUs. When the need doesn't originate from the BU, adoption stalls. The operating model needs a mechanism where BUs come to TGH with problems, and TGH sources or builds the solution. This requires both education (BUs need to know what TGH can do) and integration (TGH needs visibility into BU pain points and open RFPs).
Over time, multiple innovation-focused departments were introduced across the Group. Each was created with strong intent. But the multiplication of mandates unintentionally fragmented ownership, created overlapping activities, and confused BUs about where to go for what. The Greenhouse's positioning and clarity suffered not because it stopped delivering, but because the landscape around it became crowded. A clear definition of what "innovation" means in the context of the Group and who owns which part is needed.
These gaps are structural, not performance issues. The team delivered within its constraints every time a mandate was given. Fixing them requires changes to how TGH connects to the Group, not changes to the team.
Over eight years, TGH has sourced and evaluated 1,200+ brands and startups. The criteria, patterns, and scoring methodologies used in programs can be systematized into a tool or methodology that BUs use for their own sourcing and assessment. This turns a manual, one-off program capability into a scalable asset for the Group. Think of it as TGH's own version of startup school: a repeatable framework for identifying, evaluating, and routing opportunities to the right part of the Group.
Fintech dominates MENA venture funding (58% of all capital in 2025). Retail and e-commerce is the second-largest sector for corporate investment (26% of corporate capital), but structured venture building in retail is virtually nonexistent. TGH is positioned in a white space that no other entity in the region occupies with the same depth of retail expertise.
The years spent building external presence were not wasted. They created the ecosystem, partnerships, investor relationships, and credibility that the next phase needs. TGH now returns to the Group with more to offer: a validated platform, proven capabilities, external validation, and a network that no internal department could have built on its own. The next phase is about deploying these strengths inward.
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| Program delivery with zero failures across all assessments | Scaling post-POC is the universal failure point |
| 1,200+ brands/startups sourced organically | BU pull model doesn't exist (push only) |
| Government partnerships as authority and revenue moat | Activities spread across too many pillars with limited team |
| Ventures commercially viable, majority still standing | Decision-making slow, case-by-case, lacks standardization |
| Opportunities | Risks |
|---|---|
| Turn sourcing capability into a systematic tool for BUs | Annual budget cycles conflict with multi-year venture timelines |
| Retail/luxury innovation is white space in MENA | Lack of consistent communication eroded internal perception over time |
| TGH returns to Group with stronger ecosystem, external validation, and proven capabilities | Group has shifted from startup experimentation to enterprise solutions |
| Bridge between startup-grade solutions and enterprise-grade deployment for the Group | Definition of "innovation" is unclear across the organization |
The workshop produced alignment on direction and surfaced the structural gaps. The following questions remain open and will need to be answered as part of defining the innovation strategy: